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Report of the informal meeting on  
Mines other Than Anti-Personnel Mines (MOTAPM 
or anti-vehicle mines)
1
  
 
Friday 6 November 2015, Geneva 
 
 
 
 
 
Jointly hosted by the United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs 
(UNODA), the United Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS) and the 
Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD) 
                                                          
1
 In the report, the weapon system addressed is referred to both as MOTAPM and anti-vehicle mines (AVMs). 
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I. Introduction 
1. Mines other than anti-personnel mines (MOTAPM), sometimes also referred to as anti-
vehicle mines, are designed to immobilize or to destroy vehicles, usually tanks or armoured 
personnel carriers, but also trucks and lighter vehicles; and to shape the movement of enemy 
armoured formations by presenting an obstacle to movement. The humanitarian and 
developmental impact of persistent and low-metal content MOTAPM has been a matter of 
concern for several years but no specific international action has been taken to date despite 
different initiatives and demarches by, inter allia, states, the United Nations and ICRC. The 
United Nations Secretary General Ban Ki-Moon in his statement to the 2014 Meeting of 
States Parties to the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW) called on States to 
“further explore ways to ensure that anti-vehicle mines no longer harm civilians, impede the 
delivery of humanitarian aid or obstruct social and economic development.”  
2. Accordingly, the United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs (UNODA), the United 
Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS) and the Geneva International Centre for 
Humanitarian Demining (GICHD) jointly hosted an informal one day meeting. The purpose 
of the meeting was to examine the humanitarian and developmental impact of MOTAPM, 
discuss possible solutions and highlight the need for the international community to move 
forward and take specific action on MOTAPM. In their opening remarks, the joint hosts 
UNODA
2
, UNMAS
3
 and GICHD
4
 emphasized that the meeting was convened not as an 
academic exercise, but to once again draw attention to the humanitarian and developmental 
challenges posed by MOTAPM and the reality for clearance operators dealing with this 
weapon. 
3. The meeting took place on Friday 6 November 2015 in Geneva. Upwards of 80 delegates 
attended the meeting, which included representatives from over 50 states, the United Nations, 
the International Committee of the Red Cross, non-governmental organizations and 
individual experts.  
  
                                                          
2
 Marco Kalbusch, Officer-In-Charge of UNODA – Geneva Branch. 
3
 Bruno Donat, Chief of the UNMAS Geneva Office.  
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II. Opening Session 
4. This session set the scene for the informal meeting by examining how militaries deploy 
MOTAPM and the evolution of military doctrine concerning this weapon. The second part of 
the session examined the current rules of IHL which are applicable to MOTAPM.  
 
Evolution of military doctrine on the use of MOTAPM (keynote speaker: Brigadier 
William Sowry, Head Australian Defence Staff – London) 
5. MOTAPM typically weigh 5 to 10 kilogrammes and are approximately the size of a dinner 
plate. Anti-handling devices
5
 can be built into MOTAPM in order to act as a deterrent to any 
tampering. The two predominant types of MOTAPM are blast mines and shaped charge 
mines. Blast mines use explosive power to destroy the target and are increasingly metal free, 
which makes them difficult to detect. Shaped charge mines are designed in such a way that 
they focus the energy of the explosive effect in order to penetrate the target. These types of 
mines contain metal and are therefore easier to detect. 
6. Although doctrines may vary from country to country, most states and their militaries use 
MOTAPM predominantly as a defensive weapon to protect their positions, borders, bases, 
equipment, and personnel. Used in either protective or tactical minefields, MOTAPM are 
aimed at either disrupting, turning, or blocking enemy formations. Such tactics can delay, 
restrict or direct the movement of enemy formations. Most modern disciplined armies mark 
mined areas to protect civilians and record the placement of MOTAPM, which in turn will 
facilitate clearance operations once active hostilities have ceased.  
7. Experience from the field has shown that non-state actors are likely to use MOTAPM to 
restrict the movement of opposing military forces and often of civilians.  They tend to be less 
disciplined in their use of MOTAPM and as such, are less likely than state forces to record 
the placement of their mines, making clearance difficult.  
8. When assessing the detectability of mines, the standard most often used is the ability to 
detect mines by using commonly available metal detection systems, which focus on the mines 
having a minimum set amount of metal (or higher) content in the mine. For example, in 
Amended Protocol II
6
 annexed to the CCW
7
, the standard for the detectability of anti-
personnel mines produced after 1 January 1997 is that the mine can “be detected by 
commonly-available technical mine detection equipment and provides a response signal 
equivalent to a signal from 8 grammes or more of iron in a single coherent mass.” 8 
Detectability is also governed by time (day/night), weather, environmental (soil type, foliage, 
moisture, terrain etc.) and operational conditions.  When militaries encounter minefields they 
                                                          
5
 A device intended to protect a mine and which is part of, linked to, attached to or placed under the mine and 
which activates when an attempt is made to tamper with the mine, Article 2.14 of Amended Protocol II.  
6
 Protocol on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Mines, Booby-Traps and Other Devices, as amended on 
3 May 1996. 
7
 Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May be 
Deemed to be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects. 
8
 Protocol on Prohibition or Restrictions on the Use of Mines, Booby-Traps and Other Devices as amended on 3 
May 1996, Part 2(a) of the Technical Annex. 
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will often prefer to breach the minefield quickly by using mainly mechanical methods. Given 
the operational realities, non-detectable mines have limited military value.  
9. There are a number of unresolved questions regarding MOTAPM, such as the differing 
standards used by militaries for the marking and monitoring of minefields and the minimal 
metal content of MOTAPM. Setting of agreed common standards would facilitate more 
effective clearance operations, particularly for humanitarian demining purposes. Much more 
needs to be done to ensure that States share information on the location and type of 
MOTAPM used during a conflict and that such information informs clearance operations 
once active hostilities have ceased.  
 
Current status of International Humanitarian Law (IHL) on the use of MOTAPM 
(keynote speaker: Mr. Louis Maresca, ICRC) 
10. The humanitarian problems caused by MOTAPM arise from both the design of these 
weapons and the way in which they are often used. Similar to anti-personnel landmines, 
MOTAPM are “victim-activated”, which means that they are designed to be detonated by the 
presence, proximity or contact of a vehicle. As seen from many conflicts, the effects of 
MOTAPM and their severe impact on civilians and civilian communities are felt not only 
during, but also many years after the end of hostilities. 
11. There is no specific treaty dedicated to comprehensively regulating MOTAPM. For States 
that are not party to the CCW, the use of MOTAPM is governed by the general rules of IHL 
regulating the conduct of hostilities which apply to all weapons.  These rules restrict how 
MOTAPM may be used in armed conflict. The most relevant rules applicable to MOTAPM 
are: 
(a) the rule of distinction which requires the parties to a conflict to distinguish at all 
times between civilians and combatants and to only direct attacks against military 
objectives; 
(b) the prohibition on indiscriminate attacks; 
(c) the rule of proportionality which prohibits attacks that may be expected to cause 
incidental harm to civilians or civilian objects that is excessive in relation to the 
concrete and direct military advantage anticipated; and 
(d) the requirement for the parties to the conflict to take all feasible precautions to 
protect civilians from the effects of an attack. 
12. In addition to these general rules, the 2005 ICRC study on customary IHL identified three 
specific customary IHL rules intended to limit the impact of landmines on civilian 
populations, including MOTAPM. These are: 
(a) when landmines are used, particular care must be taken to minimize their 
indiscriminate effects; 
(b) a party to the conflict using landmines must record their placement, as far as 
possible; and 
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(c) at the end of active hostilities, a party to the conflict which has used landmines must 
remove or otherwise render them harmless to civilians, or facilitate their removal. 
13. CCW Amended Protocol II, which applies to both international and non-international 
armed conflict, seeks to limit the indiscriminate effects of landmines and other similar 
devices. It contains a number of restrictions on the design and use of mines, which have 
implications for the employment of MOTAPM. These are: 
(a) It is prohibited to use any mine which is designed or of a nature to cause superfluous 
injury or unnecessary suffering. (Article 3.3); 
(b)  It is prohibited to use mines which employ a mechanism or device specifically 
designed to detonate the munition by the presence of commonly available mine 
detectors as a result of their magnetic or other non-contact influence during normal use 
in detection operations. (Article 3.5); 
(c) It is prohibited to use a self-deactivating mine equipped with an anti-handling 
device that is designed in such a manner that the anti-handling device is capable of 
functioning after the mine has ceased to be capable of functioning (Article 3.6); 
(d) It is prohibited to use remotely-delivered mines other than anti-personnel mines, 
unless, to the extent feasible, they are equipped with a self-destruction
9
 or self-
neutralization mechanism
10
 as well as a back-up self-deactivation feature
11
 (Article 6.3); 
and 
(e) It is prohibited to direct mines, either in offence, defence or by way of reprisals, 
against the civilian population as such or against individual civilians or civilian objects 
(Article 3.7). 
14. Amended Protocol II reinforces and builds upon the general rules of IHL. It includes 
specific prohibitions on the indiscriminate use of mines (Article 3.8) and requires the parties 
to a conflict to take a range of specific measures to protect civilians from the effects of mines 
and to facilitate the rapid clearance of these devices after the end of active hostilities. These 
include requirements to take all feasible precautions to protect the civilian population and to 
record the location of all mines laid or deployed (Articles 3.10 and 9.1). In addition, 
Amended Protocol II requires that all mines, minefields and mined areas be cleared, removed, 
destroyed or maintained “without delay after the cessation of active hostilities” (Article 10). 
15. The only regulation in the protocol specific to MOTAPM is the obligation for remotely 
delivered MOTAPM, to the extent feasible, to have a self-destruction or self-neutralization 
mechanism, and a back-up self-deactivation feature (Article 6.3). Beyond this, neither the 
general rules of IHL nor Amended Protocol II outline specific requirements for MOTAPM to 
                                                          
9
 An incorporated or externally attached automatically-functioning mechanism which secures the destruction of 
the munition into which it is incorporated or to which it is attached, idem Article 2.10. 
10
 An incorporated automatically-functioning mechanism which renders inoperable the munition into which it is 
incorporated, idem Article 2.11. 
11
 A feature automatically rendering a munition inoperable by means of the irreversible exhaustion of a 
component, for example, a battery, that is essential to the operation of the munition, idem Article 2.12. 
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be detectable, to limit the lifespan of those that are hand-emplaced or to limit the use of 
MOTAPM to perimeter marked areas. 
16. Overall, IHL contains very few rules specifically regulating MOTAPM. The rules 
applicable to MOTAPM are general and limited. There are no requirements to ensure 
MOTAPM are detectable, nor are there restrictions or regulations on their placement outside 
marked-perimeters. Only remotely delivered MOTAPM require a self-destruction or self-
neutralization mechanism and have a back-up self-deactivation feature (Article 6.3), to the 
extent feasible, otherwise there is no requirement to limit the lifespan of MOTAPM.  
 
Discussion 
17. A number of questions were raised in this session and included the following: whether 
MOTAPM are offensive or defensive weapons and if they are necessary from a military’s 
operational perspective; to what extent are the problems caused by non-State actors and how 
does IHL deal with this; would it be useful to have an export control regime for MOTAPM; 
and should MOTAPM be specifically prohibited. A question was also raised that if the 
purposes of using MOTAPM are to deny military routes and instil fear into the local 
population, are these purposes in fact violations of IHL.  
18. It was noted that MOTAPM do have military utility and armed forces are generally 
reluctant to give them up. MOTAPM are a primarily defensive weapon, though there are 
times when the mines can be used offensively to cut off a retreating enemy, for example. The 
advantages of MOTAPM are that they cover ground that a military could not cover with other 
military capabilities, they are generally considered effective against armoured vehicles and to 
degrade an enemy’s mobile operations and capabilities. The negatives are that it takes time to 
lay MOTAPM and, as it has been proved, there can be high costs for civilians. In a free 
moving battle it is possible that a military may have to attack an area which it mined earlier 
and this may result in a military restricting its own movements. When using MOTAPM, 
professional militaries can take measures to minimise the harm to civilians. It is not sufficient 
to mark and/or fence minefields; they also need to be monitored.  
19. It was also outlined that the problems caused by MOTAPM may arise from their use both 
by State armed forces and non-state armed groups. Both the general rules of IHL and the 
specific rules of Amended Protocol II apply in international and non-international conflicts 
and thus they apply equally to the armed forces of states and non-state armed groups. 
MOTAPM directed at the civilian population, whether to instil fear or for any other reason 
would be a violation of existing IHL rules. It was underlined that the ICRC is very concerned 
about the humanitarian impact of MOTAPM and supports the development of new rules, 
although it has not thus far called for their prohibition.  
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III. Challenges faced by affected States 
20. The second session focused on the impact of MOTAPM on affected States. These 
included the difficulties of clearing MOTAPM, the ongoing dangers for local populations, the 
security of MOTAPM stockpiles and the overall impact on an affected State’s development 
and in particular its social and economic progress.  
 
The Humanitarian and Developmental Impact of MOTAPM use (keynote speaker: Ms 
Rachel Irwin, Stockholm International Peace Research Institute)  
21. As a single AVM can cause multiple casualties, such an incident has far reaching 
complications and may occur long after a conflict has ended. In communities affected by 
AVMs, people are afraid to use roads and the land, especially for agriculture. Assessing the 
overall humanitarian and developmental impact of AVM has been difficult due to the poor 
reporting of incidents involving these weapons. A key problem is inaccurate reporting on 
mine accidents, which often does not include information on the type of mine that caused the 
incident. To overcome this problem, the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute 
(SIPRI) and the Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining continue to research 
and collect data on the humanitarian and developmental impact of AVMs.
12
 The first part of 
the project runs from 2015 to 2018 and records incidents involving AVMs. In the first three 
quarters of 2015, there have been 137 such incidents, which killed 232 people and injured 
259. The states with the highest numbers of AVM incidents were: Syria (17), Mali (17), 
Ukraine (14), Cambodia (14), Afghanistan (13) and Yemen (13). The majority of casualties 
(54%) were civilian. The data collected is available online through an interactive and 
quarterly-updated map.
13
 
 
Case studies (keynote speakers: Mr. Nazir Ahmad Foshanji, Permanent Mission of 
Afghanistan; Permanent Mission of Cambodia
14
; and Mr. Paul Grimsley, UNMAS 
Libya) 
22. MOTAPM pose a range of serious challenges to affected states. Since 1979, MOTAPM 
have been used throughout Afghanistan often indiscriminately and without their location and 
type being recorded. Many of the MOTAPM used have only a minimal metal content, which 
poses a major clearance challenge. In addition, the MOTAPM are not equipped with self-
neutralization devices or self-deactivation features and are often laid deep into the ground. 
The presence of MOTAPM in Afghanistan has had a significant economic, social and 
environmental impact. Many of the planned development projects in the country are affected 
by the presence of MOTAPM. As roads and agricultural lands are contaminated, internally 
displaced persons (IDPs) cannot return to their homes. Combined, these different factors have 
had a significant impact on Afghan society. 
                                                          
12
 GICHD and SIPRI’s work can be viewed at the following link: http://www.gichd.org/what-we-do/policy/anti-
vehicle-mines-avm/#.VsGZcfkrJ9M. 
13
 Ibid. 
14
 written contribution. 
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23. By September 2015, Cambodia had recorded 64,553 casualties and injuries from 
landmines and explosive remnants of war (ERW). From 2010 to 2014, more than 57 percent 
of landmine casualties were caused by MOTAPM. MOTAPM were laid by the Khmer Rouge 
on roads, paths in rural areas and routes through forests. These paths were largely unused for 
many years. However, with the increased demand for agricultural production, farmers 
through using ploughs and harvesting equipment have led to the increase in MOTAPM 
accidents. 
24. In Libya MOTAPM have caused a range of problems. For example, large stockpiles of 
MOTAPM have fallen out of government control due to ammunition storage facilities being 
looted or taken over by non-state forces. Such MOTAPM can then be used for the 
manufacturing of improvised explosive devices and may be transferred across borders. The 
presenter appealed to parties to conflicts to ensure MOTAPM are detectable and not fitted 
with anti-handling devices or have sensitive fuzes. 
 
Difficulties in Detection and Clearance of MOTAPM (keynote speaker: Mr. Tim 
Lardner, UNMAS South Sudan) 
25. MOTAPM were and continue to be used in South Sudan. The detection and clearance of 
MOTAPM have posed a range of challenges. One of the major problems for UNMAS in 
South Sudan is that the scale of the problem is unknown. There are no records of the number 
of mines laid and their location. Other factors complicating the situation are: (i) over thirty 
different types of MOTAPM have been found in the country; (ii) among these different types 
of mines are ones with minimal metal content, which further hinders detection; (iii) it is a 
challenge to clear MOTAPM which have been used in a mixed minefield (with anti-
personnel mines); (iv) clearance is carried out using machines and these are frequently 
damaged when an explosion occurs; (v) the climate and terrain of the country poses 
challenges. For example, the rainy season restricts the movement of clearance personnel.  
26. On the impact of MOTAPM in South Sudan, the number of casualties is relatively low as 
the population refrains from travelling due to the unstable security environment in the 
country. However, this number is expected to rise once the security situation improves and 
the population starts to travel again. There has already been an incident when a commercial 
bus transporting passengers between towns hit a MOTAPM resulting in 6 people killed and 
10 wounded. The presence of MOTAPM limits access throughout the country to both 
civilians and the United Nations peace keeping missions. 
 
Discussion 
27. Questions were raised concerning the data available on MOTAPM incidents. For example, 
is data collected on the use by state and non-state actors; is the data collection aimed at States 
Parties to Amended Protocol II and their compliance with that instrument; is data collected on 
when a mine was placed; and does the United Nations have to invest additional resources into 
overcoming the problems posed by MOTAPM.  
28. It was emphasized by the presenters that the collection of data is challenging and once a 
mine explodes, it is difficult to ascertain its type, but SIPRI and GICHD are working to 
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overcome this issue. Also, on the basis of clearance data there will be some indications as to 
what type of mines were used. It is even more difficult to find out who was responsible for 
laying a particular mine.  
 
 
IV. Measures to address the humanitarian impact of MOTAPM use 
29. The third session drew on the experiences of clearance specialists and organizations to 
continue to examine the challenges of clearing AVMs and the measures to overcome these 
problems and ultimately address the humanitarian impact of AVM use. 
 
Design of existing anti-vehicle mines and possible future developments (keynote speaker: 
Mr. Colin King, Fenix Insight Ltd.) 
30. Originally MOTAPM were made of either wood or metal, but now they are 
predominantly made from plastics. The use of plastics has made the production of MOTAPM 
easier and at the same time less easy to detect than mines made with metal cases. A second 
development was the introduction of MOTAPM with shaped charges designed to penetrate 
armored vehicles. This type of MOTAPM contains more metal and is therefore more easily 
detected. The lifespan of MOTAPM depends on their quality and a variety of environmental 
factors; however, if not damaged by corrosion, they may pose a long term risk for many years 
after the end of active hostilities.  
31. There are two types of safeguard methods for mitigating the risks of MOTAPM to 
civilians: procedural and technical. Procedural safeguards include those measures which seek 
to protect civilians through procedural arrangements. Examples are the fencing and marking 
of mined areas, monitoring of mined areas, and awareness raising and mine risk education. 
Drawbacks of these particular measures are that they rely on the discipline of the conflicting 
party using the mines and their willingness to provide oversight following the conflict. In 
addition, barriers and demarcations run the risk of being lost or removed before mines are 
cleared. 
32. Technical safeguards include measures that use technical means to mitigate the threat of 
MOTAPM including for example, by increasing the detectability of MOTAPM by attaching 
metal plates to plastic mines. Other examples included electronic or mechanical mechanisms 
that would self-destruct or self-neutralize MOTPAM or lead to self-deactivation of the mine. 
It was underlined that these mechanisms run the risk of malfunction, especially in difficult 
conditions such as warfare, which cannot be simulated through testing. Self-deactivation is 
the most reliable safeguard. Self-deactivation is a feature that will over the passage of time 
automatically and irreversibly render a fuze inoperable, such as by the exhaustion of a battery 
that is essential to fuze operation. 
33. There is a trend towards using fewer mines, but ones that are more destructive, intelligent 
and better able to discriminate between targets. MOTAPM are a long term threat and their 
safeguard mechanisms have the inherent threat of malfunctioning due to the difficult 
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operational environments. Therefore, a combination of safeguards would be the preferred 
approach to mitigate the threat of MOTAPM to civilians.  
 
Recent incidents and measures to mitigate impact and improve quality of reporting 
(keynote speaker: Mr. Guy Rhodes, Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian 
Demining) 
34. The ongoing research project of SIPRI and the GICHD on the humanitarian and 
developmental impact of anti-vehicle mines utilizes data from governments, mine action 
authorities and media reports. By using multiple sources, this work seeks to provide a 
comprehensive overview of the impact of MOTAPM. As the project increases its ability to 
cover more information sources, the number of casualties resulting from MOTAPM is 
expected to rise. National mine action authorities should do much more to record casualties 
and injuries resulting from MOTAPM. For example, states may reinforce their capacities to 
better disaggregate information on the type of mine involved in an incident and to focus 
greater attention on differentiating between ordnance types. It would also be useful if states 
further standardize hazard and victim reporting forms. MOTAPM are often omitted from 
mine awareness education and more needs to be done to raise awareness of the issue. Finally, 
the presenter emphasized that there is a need for further regulation on the use of MOTAPM. 
 
A perspective from the field on clearance of AVM (keynote speaker: Mr. Calvin Ruysen, 
HALO Trust) 
35. One of the biggest challenges for HALO in their operations has been the clearance of 
MOTAPM with a minimal metal content, which have often proven to be more difficult to 
clear than small anti-personnel mines. HALO has an extensive clearance operation in 
Somaliland. There are 180 hazardous areas remaining in Somaliland of which 162 are roads 
with a total surveyed length of 1,119 kilometres. The mines on the roads are often MOTAPM 
with a minimal metal content and HALO has used non-technical surveys to identify which 
areas require clearance and which areas require verification. If these mines had been metal 
cased the clearance would have been far easier and expedient. Somaliland could have been 
‘mine free’ by 2012 and the donor community could have saved approximately US$ 30 
million. The use of mechanized mine clearing systems and ground penetrating radars are 
becoming more effective, but are expensive to deploy. These methods are not effective in all 
environments and the use of mechanical clearing methods can degrade the quality of the soil.  
 36. The method used to lay MOTAPM impacts on the clearance operation. The three types 
of methods described were as follows: 
(i) Structured minefields: HALO encounters such minefields in Angola where they can 
find in excess of 1000 MOTAPM. In this type of minefield the mines are usually at 2 
metre spacings and the minefields are mixed with anti-personnel mines.  
(ii) Laying in open areas sparsely mined to defeat or channel movement of vehicles. In 
an example from Herat, Afghanistan, HALO found one MOTAPM for every 50,000 
meters squared cleared.  
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(iii) Occasional mines laid on roads and tracks. On roads in Angola, HALO found on 
average one MOTAPM every 26 kilometres.  
37. Structured minefields are quite straightforward to clear. More complicated to clear are 
sparsely mined areas, where the presence of a few mines can render large areas of land 
unusable for agriculture or construction. The same is true for occasional mines laid on roads 
and tracks, where only a few mines planted along many kilometers of road can block access 
to long stretches of road. Locating and the subsequent clearance of these MOTAPM laid 
using the two latter methods is much slower than clearing high numbers of mines in 
structured minefields. While HALO will continue to develop its methods and technology for 
the clearance of MOTAPM, the greatest technical challenge it faces is the clearance of 
MOTAPM with a minimal metal content in sandy soils. 
 
Cooperation and assistance for clearance of anti-vehicle mines (keynote speaker: Mr. 
Mark Versteden, Permanent Representation of the Kingdom of the Netherlands) 
38. The Netherlands is the fifth largest donor to mine action and does not approach the issue 
of MOTAPM separately within its overall policy on humanitarian mine action. Since 2012, 
the Netherlands uses multi-annual budget cycles for mine action. This has been done to 
increase transparency and improve the quality of the programs supported. Multi-annual 
budgets provide mine action organizations with stability and assist them in coping with 
unexpected circumstances. It was stressed that a tailor-made approach is needed for each 
individual country affected by mines. The differing economic, political and technical 
challenges of each country require an individual approach, which in turn underlines the 
importance of good coordination between like-minded countries that provide assistance.  
 
National Measures on MOTAPM within the CCW framework (keynote speaker: Mr. 
Bantan Nugroho, CCW Implementation Support Unit)  
39. States Parties to the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons have carried out 
intense work in the past on MOTAPM. Within the framework of the CCW, some States 
Parties have set out the national measures they apply to MOTAPM and which go beyond the 
requirements of current international law. For example, during the 2006 CCW Third Review 
Conference, a group of States put forward a declaration in which they detailed their national 
measures on the use, detectability, and technical requirements concerning the lifespan of 
MOTAPM.
15
 One State made a separate declaration during the same Review Conference in 
2006, which also set out its practices on the use, detectability, and technical measures 
concerning the lifespan of MOTAPMs as matter of national policy.
16
 The agenda for the 
CCW Meeting of States Parties includes the item “Other issues relevant to the Convention, 
including mines other than anti-personnel mines”,17 and this is an opportunity for States to 
provide updates on their national policies on MOTAPM. 
 
                                                          
15
 Declaration on Anti-vehicle mines, CCW/CONF.III/WP.16, 16 November 2006. 
16
 Declaration on MOTAPM, CCW/CONF.III/WP.17, 16 November 2006. 
17
 For example, see Agenda Item 9, CCW/MSP/2015/1, 30 January 2015. 
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Discussion 
40. The United States of America stated that it supports the draft protocol which was 
negotiated in the CCW and then rejected in 2006. The United States only uses detectable 
mines, has fitted all of its MOTAPM with self-destruct and self-deactivation features and 
only retains a small number of plastic MOTAPM for testing purposes. Further, the United 
States applies its national standards to the mines that it transfers internationally. Therefore, 
the United States will not transfer any mines that its own military would not use.  
41.  Questions were raised as to whether it is preferable to introduce technical solutions or 
simply to prohibit the use of MOTAPM. It was noted that MOTAPM are a relatively cheap 
weapon, but the more sophisticated versions inevitably cost more. Therefore, how could these 
costs be addressed and are there any developments on fusing that could incorporate more 
advanced mechanisms.  
42. Mr. King noted that improved technology – such as that used in mobile phones - is 
readily and cheaply available. Stockpiled mines can also be retro-fuzed. Testing of such 
mines is a problem as combat conditions produce a range of factors that are not included in 
test scenarios.  
43. The Mines Advisory Group (MAG) stated that anti-handling devices pose a real threat to 
demining staff. It also noted that the impact of a community or individual’s fear of 
MOTAPM is not taken into account when assessing the overall humanitarian impact of this 
weapon system. Ireland supported the call for more accurate reporting of mine incidents. It 
noted that there is a tendency to treat improvised explosive devices and landmines as two 
separate issues, but in reality there is considerable overlap. Accurate information is important 
for having a properly informed discussion on MOTAPM.  
 
 
V. Future activities and possible way forward 
44. The final session set out the work that had been carried within the CCW on MOTAPM 
and explored the possibilities for moving forward and addressing the humanitarian impact of 
this weapon. 
 
Background to and current status of issue within the Convention on Certain 
Convectional Weapons Framework (keynote speaker: Mr. Peter Kolarov, UNODA) 
45. The humanitarian concerns related to MOTAPM were raised during the negotiations of 
Protocol II in the 1970s and later during the First Review Conference in 1995-1996, where 
Amended Protocol II was negotiated. However, as the efforts mostly focussed on anti-
personnel mines, only specific restrictions for anti-personnel mines were prioritised in the 
text of Amended Protocol II. The regulations on MOTAPM were limited to a rather soft 
prohibition on the use remotely-delivered MOTAPM, unless, to the extent feasible, they are 
equipped with a self-destruction or self-neutralization mechanism as well as a back-up self-
deactivation feature (Article 6.3) and to a number of general restrictions on the use of  all 
mines, as contained in several provisions of Article 3. 
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46. At the Preparatory Committee for the Second Review Conference in 2000 to 2001 an 
official proposal for a new stand-alone Protocol on MOTAPM was tabled
18
 containing 
provisions on the detectability and the limitation of the lifespan of MOTAPM. Due to 
persistent divergent views among State Parties, the Second Review Conference did not adopt 
a new Protocol on MOTAPM and instead decided that the newly established open-ended 
Group of Governmental Experts (GGE) should address the issue. The GGE met between 
2001 and 2006, in which various new ideas were brought forward for the development of 
more effective controls over the design and the use of MOTAPM.
19
 This led to the 
development of a comprehensive draft Protocol. 
47. At the Third Review Conference in 2006, it became clear that consensus could not be 
achieved on a new Protocol on MOTAPM. Despite the work of the GGE, it was not possible 
to eliminate differences regarding the issues of detectability and active life. In the absence of 
a new Protocol, a group of CCW States Parties committed to a political declaration with the 
intention to take the necessary steps to adopt as a matter of national policy the practices that 
were developed in the draft Protocol on MOTAPM.
20
 
48. From 2006 to 2011, the attention of the international community on MOTAPM faded and 
instead focused on cluster munitions, leaving once again the issue of MOTAPM as unfinished 
business. At the Fourth Review Conference in 2011, it was decided to further examine the 
implementation of international humanitarian law applicable to MOTAPM and to submit a 
report to the 2012 Meeting of the High Contracting Parties to the Convention.
21
 Although, 
that CCW Meeting “welcomed the Report of the Meeting of Experts on MOTAPM”, the 
states parties were unable to reach agreement on further work on this matter.
22
  
 
Possible additions to or clarification of existing International Humanitarian Law 
(keynote speaker: Mr. Peter Herby) 
49. The issue with MOTAPM is that they are victim activated and this can often be an 
indiscriminate function. IHL defines indiscriminate attacks as “those that cannot be directed 
at a specific military objective” and weapons that are "of a nature to strike military objectives 
and civilians or civilian objects without distinction”. The question that states must answer is 
whether the indiscriminate nature of MOTAPM should be mitigated. If not, then 
consequently there is a major problem at hand in terms of violations of IHL. 
 50. The options of non-use, exclusion of civilians from mined areas, self-destruction and 
self-neutralization mechanisms or self-deactivation features, and rapid clearance were 
discussed through a framework of international law, and national and multilateral levels. Six 
                                                          
18
 Denmark, Finland, Germany, Japan, Poland, the United Kingdom and the United States of America, Protocol 
on Mines Other Than Anti-Personnel Mines, CCW/CONF.II/PC.3/WP.11. 
19
 For an overview of the work carried out between 2001 and 2006 see 
http://www.unog.ch/80256EE600585943/(httpPages)/7FAEF7CE8B841EFAC12579C1002CAF88?OpenDocu
ment. 
20
 Declaration on Anti-vehicle mines, CCW/CONF.III/WP.16, 16 November 2006. 
21
 Final Declaration, Decision 1, Part II, CCW/CONF.IV/4/Add.1, 15 December 2011. 
22
 Final report, paragraph 23, CCW/MSP/2012/9, 30 November 2012. 
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possible options as part of a broader process to strengthen the legal and technical governance 
of the humanitarian threat of MOTAPM were put forward, which were: 
(i) Engage in consistent reporting on current policy and practice (concerning points 1-4). 
(ii) Strengthen national policy and practice. 
(iii) Increase clearance resources in affected States. 
(iv) Respond to failure to clear as an IHL violation. 
(v) Prohibit transfers to parties that engage in irresponsible use of MOTAPM.  
(vi) Negotiate new international norms in the context of CCW and Amended Protocol II.  
 
Discussion 
51. Concern was expressed that the call for action on MOTAPM was an attempt to diminish 
the military capacity of certain states, when in fact the problems caused by these weapons 
was due to their “irresponsible” use by non-State actors and states outside of Amended 
Protocol II. The technical solutions proposed would not resolve the humanitarian impact as 
these were prone to failure. It was also noted that to a certain extent all weapons are 
indiscriminate and for some developing States MOTAPM is a useful weapon system. One 
question was whether the issues raised by Mr. Herby could be addressed within the context of 
the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT). Also, could the problems caused by MOTAPM be addressed 
by the implementation in good faith of Amended Protocol II? Mines could be included in the 
ATT, but the problem is that any transfer prohibition would be based on existing international 
law which is ambiguous. In the twenty years since its adoption, Amended Protocol II has not 
managed to address the concerns associated with the use of MOTAPM. Moreover, the 
Protocol is still not universal and does not specifically and efficiently regulate the issues that 
have been identified as being the main cause for the humanitarian and developmental impact 
of MOTAPM, including the limitation of their active life, their detectability by standard 
metal detection equipment, the use of MOTAPM with sensitive fuzes, the effective protection 
of civilians and others. 
 
 
VI. Conclusion 
51. The one day meeting on MOTAPM was aimed at focusing the attention of the 
international community on the still unsolved problem of MOTAPM. The meeting was not 
planned as a goal in itself, but as one step in a continuing process aimed at increasing 
knowledge and awareness on the humanitarian and development impact of the use of 
MOTAPM and an opportunity for an open and informal dialogue on the measures that could 
be undertaken by the international community to address this impact. The organizers, based 
on their expertise and experience from the field, have been engaged for a number of years in 
advocacy in favour of the adoption of a number of efficient legal and other measures, that 
would address the humanitarian concerns associated with MOTAPM. Against this 
background the organizers will continue their work on MOTAPM in all relevant fora and, in 
particular, look forward to the opportunity for further franc and fruitful discussion on this 
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issue which the Fifth Review Conference of the States Parties to the CCW to be held in 
December 2016 represent.   
52. In his closing address to the meeting, Michael Møller, Director-General of the United 
Nations Office at Geneva and Secretary-General of the Conference on Disarmament, stated, 
“Looking forward, the Fifth Review Conference of the Convention on Certain Conventional 
Weapons (CCW) will provide us with the opportunity to take action on anti-vehicle mines. 
This action can take place within the CCW framework as in other disarmament fora. But, I 
would like to encourage States and Civil Society Organisations alike to continue the pursuit 
of effective regulation for these weapons.” 
_____ 
 
